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Professor Susan J. STABILE: My name is Susan Stabile. I am
an Associate Professor here at the St. John's School of Law.
Welcome to the first of what I am sure you will find to be four
tremendous panels addressing various aspects of tax law.
We start off today with a focus on financial products or de-
rivatives. What are derivatives or financial products? I recently
read a comment suggesting that derivatives are like obscenities:
We generally know them when we see them even if we do not of-
ten think of the dictionary definition of the term.
In simplest terms, a derivative is a security whose value rises
and falls depending on what happens to some other security,
commodity or group or index of securities or commodities to
which the derivative is linked. Broadly speaking, derivatives
can be divided into equity derivatives and debt derivatives, al-
though the form of these products can vary tremendously, as you
will see from our speakers today. The focus of our panel today
will be primarily on entity derivatives.
Parties enter into derivatives for various reasons. One of the
most common uses of financial products is asset management.
That is, someone who owns an equity security enters into it a
derivative to hedge exposure to the risk of a downturn in that se-
curity.
Another common use of equity derivatives is to create a syn-
thetic position, to effectively create the ability to gain from a
particular security without actually having the security in your
portfolio. The focus today of our speakers will be on the first of
those uses, on the use of derivatives as part of an asset manage-
ment scheme. However, time permitting, they may also get to
the use of derivatives as an alternative to buying an equity se-
curity.
Let me now turn this over to Clarissa Potter, our first speaker
**** Abraham N.M. "Hap" Shashy is a tax partner in the Washington, D.C. office of
King & Spalding. He joined the firm in 1993 after completing his appointment as Chief
Counsel for the Internal Revenue Service from February 1990 through January 1993.
Mr. Shashy has experience in a broad array of federal income tax areas.
Mr. Shashy received his B.S. in Political Science with highest honors from the Uni-
versity of Florida in 1970, and received his J.D. degree with highest honors from the
University of Florida School of Law in 1973. In 1975, Mr. Shashy received his LL.M. in
Taxation from New York University School of Law where he served as Managing Editor
of the Tax Law Review. From 1975-1976, he taught full-time in the Graduate Tax Pro-
gram at New York University School of Law. From 1976-1984, he served as an adjunct
professor in the Tax Program while practicing law in New York City.
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who will give us an overview of the tax issues that have to be
looked at when dealing with financial products.
Ms. Clarissa C. POTTER: Good morning. It is really wonder-
ful to be here on this beautiful day in this wonderful facility. Let
me give you just a little background about what I do, and then I
am going to start this off by identifying the overall tax concerns
we have when we look at derivatives. Then, the rest of the panel
will speak in more detail about particular transactions and par-
ticular issues.
As Acting Tax Legislative Counsel, I have the primary re-
sponsibility for all domestic tax policy issues. Whenever legisla-
tion is proposed or enacted, whenever regulations are proposed
or drafted or issued, they go through me. I have to keep fore-
most in my mind basic tax policy concerns. I think that in the
financial products area, these policy concerns are often very
starkly illuminated. But to set the stage it is worth briefly re-
viewing the factors that I consider when I think about a financial
product, or a particular approach to financial products.
Obviously, the first thing I think about when I consider tax
policy relating to financial products is fairness, meaning treating
similarly situated taxpayers similarly, treating differently situ-
ated taxpayers differently, and trying to create a symmetry be-
tween the parties that enter into financial products.
Each of these things turns out to be very difficult in the area of
financial products because of the malleability of the products;
taxpayers can vary minor aspects of their transactions or their
contracts, and end up with very different results. It is also very
hard because of the development of the treatment of financial
products over the years. The incremental evolution of the law
itself makes it difficult to pick out whose treatment should be
symmetrical or whose should be analogous.
Ed Kleinbard invented the concept of cubbies, or cubbyholes,
as they apply to financial products. The idea is that we have cer-
tain known types of financial transactions, debt and equity, for
example, and we know how those instruments are treated under
the tax code. When we find something new, we have to try really
hard to either squeeze it into the debt cubbyhole or into the eq-
uity cubbyhole. However, over time we have developed quite a
large number of these cubbyholes describing different kinds of
instruments and transactions. Fairness, therefore, becomes
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problematic in the context of financial products because it is
hard to decide which existing transaction the current transaction
is most like.
Economic efficiency is another major consideration. We try
very hard, though we are seldom successful, to ensure that our
rules are not a motivating incentive or disincentive for taxpayer
behavior action. Ideally, tax rules would not be the reason tax-
payers engage in particular transactions.
In addition, when we develop an approach to the tax treatment
of financial transactions, we try very hard to get as close to the
economics of the transactions as possible. This also is a difficult
task because often the economics are quite complicated and diffi-
cult to discern, perhaps not in the abstract, but in practice.
Ability to pay tax is also something that is traditionally a con-
cern. Is it appropriate to tax someone at a certain point? Do
they have the ability to pay the taxes at that point? That is often
an issue in realization-based taxation. For example, inherent in
realization-based taxation is the idea that when you own an as-
set you should not be taxed on the gain from that asset until you
have realized the gain. Until that point, you do not have the cash
in hand to pay the taxes. The concern over a taxpayer's ability to
pay, based on a realization approach, has faded over time. Con-
sequently, you will find that in many of the newer rules that
apply to financial transactions, we have moved away from this
idea that we do not impose tax until the taxpayer actually has
cash in hand.
Finally, another important consideration for me as a tax ad-
ministrator is ease of administration. In a lot of discussions, cer-
tainly in theoretical and academic discussions, this is a consid-
eration that gets very short shrift. When we talk about how a
particular transaction is structured and how it should be taxed,
the question always arises: What do we know about that trans-
action in reality, and how can we find out that information?
More and more, a popular approach to dealing with the problems
presented by financial transactions, derivatives in particular, is
something called mark-to-market. This means that periodically
the taxpayer's position in the contract is valued and compared to
a prior value (i.e., the value at the time when the taxpayer en-
tered into the transaction or at the end of the taxpayer's prior
taxable year). You compare the two values so that if the contract
[Vol. 13:1
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has appreciated in value, you tax the appreciation. The basic
idea of mark-to-market is that it might be appropriate periodi-
cally, once a year say, to check that change in value and tax the
taxpayer based on that change. So, if the financial instrument
appreciated by $20, you tax the $20.
It sounds very simple. From an administrative perspective,
however, except in very limited cases, such as stock that is
traded on the New York Stock Exchange, it is a difficult rule to
administer. It is difficult for a variety of reasons. Principally, it
is difficult for taxpayers and the IRS to determine the value of a
contract even if the contract is publicly traded, and certainly it is
difficult when you get beyond the simple case. I think the ad-
ministration of a particular rule is applied to a financial trans-
action often comes to the forefront in terms of policy concerns
about the rules you apply to the transactions.
These are the overriding concerns: Fairness, efficiency, ability
to pay, and the ease of administration. Apart from these broad
policy concerns, there are other tax concerns that are implicated
by financial transactions and derivatives in particular. These
can be classified in four or five categories. All of these categories
actually overlap, but I will address them as if they are separate
concepts.
First is the proper measurement of income. Second is the tim-
ing of the income, which is very closely related to the proper
measurement of the income. Third is the timing of deductions,
which is ancillary to or a corollary of timing of income. Fourth,
there is the character of the income, whether it is ordinary or
capital, whether it represents interest or a dividend. Related to
this, when you talk about an asset, is the holding period of the
asset. Finally, in the international context, a very important
concept is source.
Let me just very quickly elaborate on these ideas, and then we
can see how these ideas come into play when we discuss the
particular transactions we are going to talk about. The rest of
the panelists will describe the proper measurement of income,
but one of the big problems that we face in the financial deriva-
tives context is the lump-sum payment made by one of the par-
ties. The payment can be conceptualized in two ways: It could be
income or it could be a loan.
Under general tax principles, the principal amount of the loan
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is not income to the taxpayer because that amount must be paid
back to the lender. In the classic case of the loan with fixed in-
terest and fixed principal, this is very clear. I borrow $100 and I
am going to have to pay interest on it. In five years I am going to
have to pay $100 back.
When you move away from that classic case and into the world
of contingent borrowings, the concept becomes more difficult. Say
I borrow $100 and I am going to buy an asset with it. I say to
the lender, "You know, I am going to pay you interest but I am
not going to pay you market rate of interest. I am going to pay
you a lower rate but you get part of the appreciation of my prop-
erty if it appreciates. I am not going to give you $100 back. I
may give you $110. I may give you $90."
In that case, it is more difficult to discern whether the $100
that comes in on the loan should be treated entirely as principal
on the loan, or whether there may be something else going on.
Rather, the transaction may include a loan and some other kind
of contract, and perhaps the $100 payment may be partially at-
tributable to this other contract. How do you decide what other
kind of contract is imbedded in this transaction, how do you de-
cide how much of the $100 to attribute to that contract, and how
should the amount attributed be taxed?
Timing. Again, you get that $100 lump-sum amount and as-
sume it is not a loan. Should you take it all into income up
front? Should it be spread out over the period of the contract?
Should part of it be deferred under what we will refer to later as
the "open transaction doctrine"? In other words, assume I know
that some or all of the $100 is income, but I do not know how
much, so I will have to wait and see.
When there is no cash flow-when I do not receive a lump sum
but I have entered into some kind of transaction-does that cre-
ate an event that would cause me to recognize gain or income for
some other reason? We will talk about that in a minute in the
case of constructive sales transactions.
Finally, I talked briefly before about mark-to-market, which is
this idea that I would value my assets periodically to figure out
how much income I should take into account.
All of these different approaches appear somewhere along the
spectrum between the mark-to-market system, which does not
require any kind of a realization event or any particular cash
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flow to result in income recognition, and the other extreme,
which would be the repayment of a loan, when there is cash but
no income. You find points all along that spectrum where fi-
nancial products fall into place: It is often problematic, especially
in the context of a new financial product, to figure out where
they should fall.
I mentioned deductions before. Should a deduction associated
with the financial transaction be accrued over time? Even if I
know generally the amount of a-deduction that I will associate
with a financial transaction, should I spread it out over time in a
way that is unrelated to the cash flows but is perhaps related to
the economics of the transaction? Should I use matching con-
cepts to try to link that deduction to a particular item of income
and offset those two? We have got provisions like the hedge
timing rules which try to match deductions and income, 1 and
netting rules for notional principal contracts that try to actually
match cash flows, such that if you have cash flows that offset,
you take that into account. 2 Then we have a number of rules
that defer deductions to prevent taxpayers from currently reduc-
ing their income and then deferring tax. For example, we have
the so-called straddle rules which provide that in situations
where you have a position that generates income and a position
that generates deductions that are closely linked, you have got to
wait for the income to take the deduction. 3 You cannot just take
the deduction first. Similarly, the wash-sale rules try to ac-
complish the same thing.4
Character of income or deduction is another very important
consideration in financial transactions. It is often difficult to de-
termine the character of income and deductions from derivatives.
In the recent past, since the passage of the Tax Reform Act of
1986, many thought about character less as a question of the
rate of tax that applied to income and more of a question of tim-
ing. Typically, with capital gains or capital losses, the taxpayer
has more control over timing. This is in contrast to ordinary in-
come and ordinary deductions, where there tends to be less con-
trol over timing.
1 Treas. Reg. 1.446-(a)(2)(i)(1998) (hedge).
2 Treas. Reg. 1.446-3(g)(1) (1998) (swap).
3 I.R.C. § 1092 (1998) (straddles).
4 Treas. Reg. 1.1092b-iT (1998); I.R.C. § 1091(e) (1998) (wash sale rules).
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Last year, however, because of the dramatic reduction in the
rates that apply to long-term capital gains, 5 we rediscovered
other considerations in addition to the timing of income. So, it
becomes much more important to think about whether a particu-
lar item of income or deduction is capital or ordinary.
The other issue I mentioned as particularly relevant to charac-
ter and capital gains is the question of holding period. The
holding period is something that derivative contracts are often
used to manipulate. For example, if a taxpayer no longer wants
to hold an asset, but would recognize short-term capital gain if
the asset were sold, the taxpayer can use a derivative to dispose
of the economics of the asset without having a realization even
for tax purposes. The goal is to put off recognizing the gain so
that it can be converted from being short-term capital gain to
being a long-term capital gain and thereby obtain the benefits of
long-term capital gain rates.
That covers the many issues I generally take into account
when I think about the taxation of derivatives. I briefly men-
tioned source, which is of particular interest in the cross-border
context. In general, U.S. taxpayers, as you know, are subject to
tax on all of their worldwide income regardless of its source.
However, taxpayers can reduce their U.S. tax liability by being
able to obtain the benefit of a credit for foreign taxes on foreign-
source income. It is often very advantageous for U.S. taxpayers
to change the source of their income from U.S. source to foreign
source. Derivatives can be used under a variety of strategies to
accomplish that.
Mr. Edward KLEINBARD: First, before we let you off the hook
here, you said one thing that I thought was quite surprising in
your list of goals that the Treasury has in looking at financial in-
struments, and that was symmetry between the issuer and an
investor, so that what happens on the issuer side is mirrored on
the investor side. Symmetry obviously is one of those qualities
that human beings have a quick and sort of superficial attach-
ment to, sort of an easy aesthetic. But why on earth should
symmetry be a goal of the tax policy of the United States? We
have, for example, lots of issuers who are not U.S. issuers who
5 I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(C-E) (1998) (providing lower tax rates for capital gains than for or-
dinary income).
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can issue to U.S. investors. We have investors that are tax ex-
empt; in fact, they dominate most of the capital markets. We
have investors that are taxable. We have individuals. We have
corporations. We have corporations with losses, corporations
that are paying taxes. Why is symmetry important?
MS. POTTER: I think that historically symmetry was thought
to be more important than it probably is now. Let me give a
quick example. In the case of a loan from a lender to a borrower,
the borrower is going to pay interest on the loan. Tax rules will
tell the borrower how much interest it can deduct each year.
Correspondingly, tax rules should tell the lender how much in-
terest it should include each year. If you have got the economics
of the transaction correct, theoretically you should tell the bor-
rower to deduct the same amount of interest at any particular
time as the lender is including.
Now, that is an extreme simplification. There are lots of rea-
sons why that may not be true, why you may not end up with
that result. First, we hardly ever get the economics right. It is
very, very difficult to get the economics right even in a very
simple loan.
Secondly, taxpayers, the lender and the borrower, may be in
completely different situations created by the tax system. This
is the most common case: The lender is a pension fund or some
other tax-exempt person. It is not concerned with what kind of
interest income it is receiving and how it is taxed. That means
nothing to it. The borrower, however, who is entitled to interest
deductions, will care a great deal about how quickly it gets to
deduct its interest. The borrower would prefer to be able to de-
duct all of the interest in the first year even if the loan has a
five-year term. If you have a tax-exempt lender on the other
side, the lender would be perfectly happy to include all its inter-
est in the first year. So, besides the fact that we do not get the
economics right, the taxpayers are often in very different situa-
tions.
I think those are the two primary reasons why there is a
movement away from symmetry. In general, you start with
symmetry because symmetry has historically been viewed as an
antidote to tax rules that do not accurately reflect the economics
of a transaction. But because of the recognition of the dramatic
differences in the rules that apply to taxpayers, symmetry is no
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longer seen as serving this function and so is not such an impor-
tant policy consideration. Nonetheless, I think many people be-
lieve still in symmetry. Ed, I am sure that you have gone to peo-
ple and argued in favor of symmetry when you did not like some
rule that was proposed.
MR. KLEINBARD: No.
MS. POTTER: You never do that, Ed.
MR. KLEINBARD: I would never do that. I am intellectually
consistent at all times.
MS. POTTER: Yes, that is right and next time Ed comes in
and says, "This is completely unfair to the other side of the
transaction," I will remember that.
MR. KLEINBARD: I think of symmetry as the excuse for not
getting the rules right. "Well, we did not get the economics right
but we should not worry because it is symmetrical." So, what we
give one side we will take back from the other and, of course, for
the reasons you stated, it never works. Symmetry strikes me as
a false kind of comfort for poor tax rules.
MS. POTTER: Generally, I would agree with that. I think the
problem tends to be that, historically, people have believed in
symmetry as an independent norm. You find even now that
most statutory provisions are enacted based on the concept of
symmetry, and that policy makers in general are very loath to
move away from symmetry. In fact, a number of legislative pro-
visions were proposed in the last couple of years relating to
drawing the line between debt and equity. A corporate issuer is-
sues an instrument. Is it debt? Is it equity? The Treasury pro-
posed a number of rules to deny interest deductions when the in-
strument was just a little too close to equity. The complaint
most often heard when people came in to discuss these proposals
was, "This is a heads you win, tails we lose" approach for the
Government, which seems, at a very gut level, a bad approach.
It is an intuitive reaction, and yet when you really look at the
policy basis for symmetry, I think you come up with some real
questions about it. So much for that.
MR. SHASHY: I cannot resist. Clarissa, may I ask you one
question?
MS. POTTER: Absolutely. I knew this was how this was going
to turn out. The other panelists told me they were going to talk
about this other stuff. They really came here to ask me ques-
[Vol. 13:1
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tions.
MR. SHASHY: Yes, it is the classic bait and switch. You
talked about four principles: Fairness, efficiency, ability to pay
and administrability. These are all valid principals from a pol-
icy-making standpoint. Let's talk for a second about adminis-
trability. The flip side of that is the taxpayer's ability to comply
with rules. We have heard a lot and thought a lot about the
growing complexity in the tax law. I think it is safe to say, as
you did, that the emphasis has been on getting the right answer
as opposed to administrability. Not that administrability has
not been considered. We are talking about emphasis here.
The questions is whether you think that the focus on getting it
right has been a trend over the last ten years, particularly in the
area of taxation of financial products. Do you see any movement
in the other direction as a trend? More consideration of adminis-
trability and the ease of taxpayer compliance?
MS. POTTER: I think there is always a tremendous tension
that presents itself on that question and I think for any particu-
lar project or for any particular issue, the weight given to either
economic accuracy or administrability fluctuates a great deal.
There is a pretty profound understanding of this at the Treasury
Department and at the IRS.
I gave the example of mark-to-market as a new approach that
seems economically accurate, simple and seemed administrable.
It turns out that it is not-surprise, surprise. I think mark-to-
market is something that has received a lot of attention, a lot of
work and a lot of interest in the last four or five years. It has
brought to the forefront this problem of administrability and
ease of compliance.
Since there seems to be a tension between economic accuracy
and administrability in the treatment of derivatives under the
tax law, the question is the cost of simplicity. This is actually
probably more of a political question than a policy question. It is
possible to write rules, I believe, that are fairly simple to admin-
ister and fairly simple to comply with, but that violate fairly pro-
foundly some of these other values like efficiency and perhaps
even fairness.
People can make the determination that simplicity is worth it
from a societal perspective. What kind of resources are we going
to expend on people like me trying to figure out how derivatives
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should be taxed, and on people like Ed telling their clients how
we would tax their transactions and accordingly what kind of
derivatives they should create? That is a different question than
the efficiency of the particular tax rule.
The problem is that, as a political matter, people have been
unwilling to accept the kind of rough justice you get when you
write those kinds of rules. The result is that you end up, if you
are not careful, with very simple, administrable rules that are
only for the benefit of taxpayers. Anyone who finds those rules
onerous or not suitable for their particular transaction, at least
from their perspective, can obtain a different set of rules which
more closely track the economics of their transaction. That ends
up being even worse than a relatively complicated system- at
least from the perspective of collecting the right amount of tax
from the right people. From a fairness perspective, it becomes
even worse than a relatively complex, more difficult to adminis-
ter approach that applies to everybody generally.
MR. KLEINBARD: In private practice, I think that the univer-
sal experience is that taxpayers are willing to put a lot of energy
into understanding very difficult rules that produce favorable re-
sults for them and find that rules that produce unfavorable re-
sults are too damned complicated. That is funny how that
works.
MR. SHASHY: Clarissa has laid the foundation to describe the
effects for a number of different financial products, derivative
products, in light of the principles she has described.
Imagine, again, our hypothetical taxpayer owns- has a posi-
tion in equity investments, stock for example, and that the posi-
tion has gone up in value. The taxpayer could be an individual.
It could be a corporation. It could be you.
Let's imagine the taxpayer has this investment and wants to
hedge against risk with respect to the position, perhaps monetize
the investment. The taxpayer is hesitant to do those things in
the traditional way, which would be a sale of the asset, because
of tax consequences triggering gain.
There have been a number of products, some of them contrac-
tual and some of them market transactions, that have developed
over the years whereby taxpayers have essentially been able to
successfully shed the risk with respect to a position. Sometimes
they even have been able to monetize the position without trig-
[Vol. 13:1
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gering tax gains.
Some of those products are of mere historical importance.
They have seen better days from a tax standpoint because legis-
lation has caught up with them or regulations have caught up
with them. However, one of the things that I think you will
sense as we talk about these various products is the evolutionary
process that goes on in the market place, as taxpayers find new
and ever more interesting ways to manage their assets tax-
efficiently.
I want to talk to you about two things primarily: Equity swaps
and short sales. My comments about the tax consequences of
these two items should be considered largely historical. Mary
Harmon will talk about section 1259 and tell you about how that
provision, which was enacted in 1997, changed the tax results of
the two products I am about to describe for you.
An equity swap is a financial derivative that is contractual in
nature. It is a contractual arrangement whereby the owner of a
position in stock would for a defined period of time, which is the
term of the equity swap contract, part with risk from the posi-
tion and essentially transmute that position into a synthetic eco-
nomic position with respect to another investment. Assume that
the taxpayer, who owns stock that has appreciated, goes to a
bank or other financial intermediary and enters into a swap con-
tract. Under the terms of the swap contract, the taxpayer agrees
to pass along to the counterparty, to the bank, the economics if
you will, with respect to the stock position that the taxpayer
continues to hold as a nominal matter. That means that over the
term of the contract, the taxpayer will pass dividends along to
the counterparty. It would also pay the counterparty the appre-
ciation, if you will, with respect to the stock position that occurs
during the term of the contract.
The counterparty, for its part, will agree to pay the taxpayer
the returns that are based on or derived from another financial
instrument. In the case of a swap based on the S&P 500 Index,
the counterparty would agree to pay the taxpayer appreciation
that occurs with respect to the S&P 500 Index.
If the S&P goes down in value, then the taxpayer would owe
the counterparty, the bank, the difference between the stock
value and the S&P 500 value. If the equity position in the stock
goes down in value, the counterparty would pay the taxpayer.
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Those are basically the economics. It is a contractual trade, if
you will, or exchange of the economics from two different posi-
tions. At the end of the term of the swap contract, the economic
calculations are done. One party will have profited and the other
will have lost. Whoever is in a profit position will get a net pay-
ment. Whoever is in a loss position will make a net payment.
Historically the taxation of that transaction has been rela-
tively simple. The profit is taxable, and the loss is deductible at
the point in time when the payment is received or the payment is
made. That is a basic equity swap described fairly briefly. There
obviously are much more complex swaps that can be done.
Let's talk next about a short sale. Short sales come in two fla-
vors for purposes of this discussion. First, let's talk about a basic
short sale, what I will call a naked short sale. In the case of a
naked short sale, the taxpayer that does not own a given item of
property nonetheless wants to sell the property. So, in a short
sale you basically sell something that you do not own. I grew up
thinking that if you sold something you did not own, you go to
jail. I grew up to find out that Wall Street does it every day. It
is an interesting transaction.
Why would you sell something that you do not own? Well, you
would sell something at today's price that you did not own if you
thought the price or the value of that asset was going to go down
over the time, so that after having sold it at today's price, you
could go into the market later, buy it at a lower price and make a
profit. Is that a good idea? Well, if you guess correctly, and the
value of the asset goes down, it is a great idea and you will make
money. If you guess incorrectly, you will lose a lot of money.
Since there is no upside limit, there is no ceiling on the values to
which stocks can soar; your risk in a naked short sale is unlim-
ited. So, it is a very risky proposition.
The way in which a short sale is effectuated is you call your
broker and you say to your broker, "I would like to sell short, 100
shares of XYZ stock." The broker implements that transaction
for you by finding a buyer who wants to buy 100 shares of XYZ
stock at today's price. Once the buyer ponies up the money, the
broker advances stock or delivers stock to the buyer. Since the
taxpayer on whose behalf the short sale has been made did not
own the stock, the broker is essentially advancing the stock on
behalf of the taxpayer to the seller. The broker will make an en-
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try in the taxpayer's margin account indicating an obligation on
the part of the taxpayer to deliver to the broker an equivalent
amount of stock at some point in the future.
When the short sale takes place, that is the point in time when
the short sale is opened. When the taxpayer delivers the
equivalent amount of stock to the broker, that is the point in
time when the short sale is closed. Those terms have signifi-
cance from the tax standpoint.
During the pendency of the short sale, after it is opened and
before it is closed, an additional calculation must be made if the
underlying stock that has been sold and has been essentially ad-
vanced by the broker is dividend-paying stock. In that case, the
taxpayer will make payments to the broker to compensate for the
fact that the broker has had to borrow stock from some other
source and advance it to implement the short sale, and that the
broker is paying a dividend equivalent amount to whomever
loaned the stock to the broker.
In the taxpayer's account, the cash proceeds from the sale are
entered as a credit so the taxpayer has that credit in its account.
He cannot take the money out because there are securities
regulations and broker policy. In fact, it is a margin transaction
and the margin rules require the taxpayer to post in the margin
account additional collateral security for the open short position
to ensure that it will ultimately be closed.
Historically the tax system has viewed short sale transactions
as open transactions. That law began to develop over 60 years
ago. It is reflected in the regulations under section 1233. From
an income tax standpoint, a short sale is not consummated until
the taxpayer delivers the stock to the broker to close the short
sale.
Why is that? The reason from a tax standpoint is that until
the taxpayer delivers stock to close the short sale, you do not
know what the taxpayer's basis is for the property the taxpayer
will have disposed of, and the tax law therefore holds the trans-
action until the closing occurs. Note what has happened. The
taxpayer has been paid proceeds from the short sale and typi-
cally in the tax system, when you receive proceeds of cash, that
is deemed an appropriate time to tax the taxpayer. In this case,
however, because of the uncertainty of what the ultimate tax
gain or loss will be, because you do not know yet what the tax-
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payer's basis is for what will be delivered to close the short sale,
the tax system holds the transaction open.
Now, let's talk about a short sale against the box. A short sale
against the box is a little different. In a short sale against the
box the taxpayer enters into a short sale with respect to the
stock that the taxpayer currently owns, that the taxpayer has in
its account. Let's imagine stock that was bought more than 18
months ago and that it has appreciated in value since the tax-
payer purchased the stock. The taxpayer would like to shed risk,
or hedge against a risk of a future decline in value of that posi-
tion. However, the taxpayer would like not to sell the stock in a
traditional way, thus triggering gain from a federal income tax
standpoint.
The taxpayer calls the broker, just as in the naked short sale,
and asks the broker to sell short from the taxpayer's account the
number of shares of stock that the taxpayer has in the account.
The broker delivers stock to the buyer that again is borrowed by
the broker; the broker does not deliver stock from the taxpayer's
account. Until very recently, the same open transaction rule
applied from the taxpayer's standpoint. The taxpayer's account
was credited with cash from the short sale, and the transaction
remained open as a matter of tax law. This was because the
taxpayer might close the short sale ultimately by delivering the
stock from the taxpayer's account, which has appreciated
greatly, or the taxpayer might go into the market and buy an-
other block of stock equivalent to the number of shares sold short
and deliver those shares. The tax consequences for the taxpayer
would differ because those two blocks would have a different ba-
sis. So, the transaction was held open until the taxpayer closed
the transaction. Historically, that is the way the short sale
against the box was treated in the tax law.
Again, if there are dividends on the underlying stock, the tax-
payer makes a dividend equivalent payment to the broker. In
this instance, because of the fact that the taxpayer actually has
the securities in the taxpayer's account that were sold short,
there is no requirement that the taxpayer post additional margin
in the account. While the taxpayer cannot withdraw the pro-
ceeds of the short sale from the taxpayer's account, the taxpayer
can borrow against those proceeds. I think up to 95 percent of
those proceeds can be borrowed by the taxpayer.
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Now, while the proceeds are sitting in the taxpayer's account,
if the taxpayer has enough clout with the brokerage firm, it ef-
fectively will be paid interest effectively in the form of a rebate
on those funds. Most small retail customers typically do not get
that rebate. Those are the basics with respect to equity swaps
and short sales. I think at this point, Mary, it would be timely
for you to talk a little about constructive sales.
MS. POTTER: Actually, let me just ask a question that may
draw useful analogy here. Assume I did the short sale against
the box and my broker held cash for me from the sale, and I de-
cided to borrow that cash from the broker and invest it in the
S&P 500. It is true that I would then have approximately the
same transaction as the swap transaction you described origi-
nally.
MR. SHASHY: That is right.
MS. POTTER: That shows that the equity swap transaction
gives you almost the identical economics that you get from these
two transactions, the short sale against the box plus the borrow-
ing and the additional investment. That turns out to be true in
the case of an awful lot of financial transactions where you can
replicate a transaction that you can do in one step by taking
three or four steps: The additional steps might give you different
tax results.
MS. HARMON: That is a perfect lead-in to the next topic
which is the new constructive sale legislation that was enacted
last year, section 1259 of the Internal Revenue Code. I noticed
when Clarissa was listing the considerations that the Govern-
ment takes into account when they are thinking about rules, in-
terpreting rules and coming up with new rules, she talked about
the realization concept. Here is just a little dig. She mentioned
that the concept has been fading over time. I would suggest that
it is fading much more rapidly in the last five years than -
MS. POTTER: Since I have been in the Government.
MS. HARMON:-in the previous 100.
MS. POTTER: One of my mottoes is that realization is about
cash and I just do not believe in cash.
MS. HARMON: The constructive sale legislation-the name
tells you a little bit about what the Government and what Con-
gress decided to do-imposes sale treatment in cases where no
actual sale existed in the legal sense or tax sense prior to the en-
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actment of this legislation.
The equity swap and the short sale against the box that Hap
described, are transactions where the shareholder had the un-
derlying stock and then entered into these transactions either to
hedge some or all of the market risks of that stock, or to diversify
that stock investment into a different investment such as the
S&P 500, which is the example that we were using.
Section 1259 represents a fundamental movement in the tax
law. It is certainly not, in my opinion, an inappropriate policy
decision to make, but it should be recognized as a fundamental
change from the realization concept that we have lived with for
years and years. There had been some movement in this direc-
tion previously, for example, the mark-to-market for dealers. 6
The difference is that dealers typically had to mark-to-market
for accounting purposes anyway and are in a better position to do
so. Section 1259 is very different.
Section 1259 provides that if you have an underlying position
in stock, debt or a partnership interest that has appreciated in
value, and you enter into certain types of financial contracts with
respect to that stock or substantially identical stock, debt or a
partnership interest, then you will be treated as if you had sold
the underlying stock, debt or partnership interest.
Financial positions that trigger a constructive sale are (1) the
short sale against the box that Hap just described, where you
own the stock and do a short sale, and (2) a total return swap,
which was the type of swap that Hap showed you, where you
take the total return of your underlying shares and trade it into
some other return, either the S&P 500 or maybe a debt return.
In each case, you eliminate all of your downside risk and you
provide all of the upside to the bank or investment bank. The
constructive sale rules are also triggered by a short futures or a
forward contract, where you set a price today and agree to sell
your stock forward at that price in the future. Further, just to
make sure that people do not reverse the transaction by entering
into the swap first and then buying the asset, this reverse trans-
action is also covered by the legislation. Also serving as triggers
for sale treatment are other transactions that (1) have substan-
tially the same effect as those described above, and (2) are de-
6 I.R.C. § 475 (1998).
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scribed in regulations, which under the legislative history are to
be prospective. I would guess that, at least with respect to col-
lars, the regulations will be prospective, except in cases of abuse.
I assume that any regulations in this area will be prospective
unless a transaction provides exactly the economics that one
would have if you entered into a short against the box.
MS. POTTER: Let me quickly interject a few things that I
think are worth noting. First of all, the base concept behind this
legislation is that if a taxpayer has 100 shares of IBM and he
goes out and sells those shares, even if he invests every penny
from the sale, the taxpayer still owes tax on the gain he had in
the IBM shares. Then, if instead of actually selling those shares,
I go through a number of other steps by entering into these fi-
nancial transactions,-engaging in a short sale against the box of
my IBM shares, then borrowing the proceeds from my broker
and investing in the S&P 500, how come I have gain in that con-
text? There we have a problem of fairness between similarly
situated taxpayers, and obviously the better informed, the better
advised, the wealthier taxpayer can take advantage of this lack
of similar treatment to obtain a tax advantage. That is my first
point.
The other point worth noting here, and this is just an aside, is
that there is another way to think about the problem. The real
reason why short sale against the box transactions did not give
rise to gain is because we have very odd accounting rules for fig-
uring out what stock you sell and when engage in a sale trans-
action. We had a rule that said taxpayers can identify any
shares they want as the shares they sold; for a short sale against
the box, what the taxpayer would say is, "I sold the shares I bor-
rowed. I did not sell the shares I owned." Now, in the case of
businesses that produce merchandise, for example, taxpayers
cannot do that. They have to use inventory accounting methods
which provide that if you make a sale of your inventory, your ac-
counting method tells you the cost of what you sold. You do not
have a choice. To a certain degree, you can look at the section
1259 legislation as imposing an accounting method for determin-
ing what securities the taxpayer sold.
MR. KLEINBARD: I really object to that not because what you
say is untrue as a policy matter. It is clearly right as a policy
matter and was developed by a learned academic article that so
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argued. 7 But in fact, the 1997 legislation wimped out. It did not
accomplish the purpose of imposing an accounting inventory type
law.
Just imagine that you have a barrel of oil and you put the oil
in by the cupful and you sell it by the cupful and you have a rule
that says I was putting in cups of oil now and selling them for
years. Now I am going to dip into my barrel and ladle out a cup
and sell it to a customer and say that is the cup I put in on June
12, 1983. I can recognize that. Of course you cannot recognize
it. It is all bundled. It is all just oil in a barrel and yet with
stock, we can do that. What Clarissa set up and then wimped
out on in 1997 -
MS. POTTER: Me? I did not wimp out on anything.
MS. HARMON: I have to say, I heard her argue in favor of av-
erage basis many times. I do not think she wimped out.
MR. KLEINBARD: In fact, we have a sort of rule like that in
the short against the box arena. But if you are just long a lot of
stock, you own 1,000 shares of stock you bought at different
points in time and then you sell 100 of those 1,000 shares, you
get to say those 100 I sold, I can recognize them and that is just
like that cup of oil from the barrel. Those are the shares I
bought on June 12, 1983, not the shares I bought on August 15,
1996. So, we did not in fact accomplish in the 1997 Act the very
policy that you just laid out.
MS. POTTER: Well, I actually share the same view on the re-
sults of the 1997 Act, but an accounting-inventory type rule for
securities was a proposal. The Administration proposed the im-
position of a single set of rules to account for sales of stocks and
securities. There were differences of opinion about what is the
right accounting method, but unfortunately there were a lot of
important people out there who were very hostile to this idea for
obvious reasons.
MR. KLEINBARD: The President wanted NAFTA. He got
NAFTA. He wanted this and he wanted that and we have gotten
this.
MS. POTTER: Well, I think it is very hard for Congress to un-
derstand how this could be so important. At any rate, the aver-
7 Edward D. Kleinbard, Risky and Riskless Positions in Securities, 71 TAXES 783
(Dec. 1993).
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age cost basis rule for securities was one of our proposals that
was not enacted. Nonetheless, I think that accounting method is
a way to think about what the constructive sale provision ac-
complishes. I am afraid that wimping out is not a fair way to put
it, since I fought very long and hard for average costs basis for
securities.
MS. HARMON: Except that obviously the constructive sale
proposal covers transactions that would not be included in an
average basis rule -
MS. POTTER: No, that is very definitely true.
MR. KLEINBARD: Right.
MS. POTTER: If the average cost basis proposal had been
passed, probably the constructive sale provisions would not have
applied to short-sale-against-the-box transactions. It already
would have been covered by an accounting method. However,
because the average cost basis proposal was not passed, the con-
structive sale provision applies to short sales against the box as
well as a number of other transactions.
MS. HARMON: Other transactions that, as Clarissa pointed
out earlier, provide very similar economics to the shareholder
and the Government. I think that is the fundamental policy
change that was made. The Government decided economics
alone would control realization for these particular structures.
I am going to briefly give you the other rules on constructive
sale. There is a 30 and 90 day rule8 which provides that where
the investor enters into a hedge during the year, closes the hedge
within the 30 days of the end of the year and stays unhedged for
60 days, the investor can wait until the subsequent year, or later
years if it wants to stay unhedged, until it sells and the con-
structive sale rules will not impose a sale treatment on the ini-
tial hedge.
It is important to note that staying unhedged for 60 days does
not mean simply avoiding a short against the box transaction or
an equity swap. It means unhedged in the context of section
246(c), 9 which is a looser standard; it means "diminishing the
risk of loss." So, during this period that the taxpayer must re-
main unhedged, the taxpayer cannot enter into put options or
8 I.R.C. §§ 1259(c)(3); 246(c)(4) (1998).
9 I.R.C. §§ 246(c)(4) (1998).
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collar transactions, which we will talk about in a minute.
There are other types of hedges. (I am using the word hedge
rather loosely. I know sometimes that drives Clarissa crazy, but
I would like to say that a taxpayer is hedging against the risk of
loss.) The taxpayer may be totally eliminating the risk of loss,
which is what the Government did not like, or the taxpayer may
be just mitigating the market risk. The taxpayer may want to
keep some of the upside or downside in the underlying stock.
When Treasury initially proposed constructive sale legislation, it
was written in those terms: In order to trigger sale treatment, a
taxpayer must substantially eliminate the upside and the down-
side in the underlying asset.
The legislative language became more specific on the Hill, but
the legislative history-and I believe both the legislative history
in both the House and Senate-repeats Treasury's initial rule
that a constructive sale is found only if a transaction eliminates
substantially all of the upside and of the downside in the under-
lying asset.
So, what financial products can you enter into if you have an
appreciated position and you do not want to be caught under the
constructive sale regulations? You clearly can purchase an at-
the-money put option and thus eliminate 100 percent of your
downside risk without triggering a sale. You can write call op-
tions. You can enter into certain collars which are put-call op-
tion combinations that I will describe.
You may be able to offset your risk with a product based on an
index like the S&P 500. If you have a portfolio of stocks, you
could swap out that return on that portfolio and into the S&P
500. You might just lose your dividends received deduction, 10
but you are not going to be within the constructive sale rule. It
would certainly be only a partial hedge, not a complete and total
hedge.
Or you might enter into a forward contract that has a variable
delivery amount because the definition of forward contracts that
trigger a constructive sale require a specific price and a specific
amount of the underlying asset to be delivered. These forward
contracts may be caught even if cash settled.
Let's talk about collars and what you can do. In a collar
10 I.R.C. § 243 (1998).
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transaction, the shareholder of XYZ corporation will buy a put
option from the bank and sell a call option to the bank. The
shareholder is trying to reduce the downside risk, and in order to
reduce the cost of buying that put option, it will sell a call option,
giving some of the upside of the underlying position to the bank.
People were doing "costless" or "premium neutral" collars.
They would try to price the transaction so that the put and call
option premia would exactly offset each other, thus there would
be no cost to entering into the transaction. We do not know ex-
actly at what level a collar will work under the constructive sale
legislation, although I assume we have regulations ready to go
out the door that will tell us.
MS. POTTER: Well, actually I think that Mary brings up an
important point about this legislation and a lot of other legisla-
tion that has to do with financial transactions. Congress tends
to grant the Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue
Service a great deal of authority to interpret the law and to pro-
vide additional rules to make the law work.
In this case, Congress recognized that it was just going to be
too difficult, and it probably was not politically feasible, for them
to say well, if you have a call option that allows somebody else to
buy the stock for a particular price and a put option that allows
you to sell it to somebody else for a particular price, how close
can those prices be? If they are both right at the current market
price, if the stock goes up, you do not get any benefit from the
stock going up. If the stock goes down, you do not suffer any
detriment. Obviously, that arrangement would be covered by
this legislation, but what if there is $5 difference? Or if there is
a 10 percent difference? What difference between the two con-
tracts does there have to be before you still have significant op-
portunity to gain on the stock you hold and significant risk of
loss?
Congress concluded that this was a very difficult line for them
to draw. As it turns out, it is a very difficult line for the Treas-
ury and the IRS to draw, too. In addition, there are a lot of other
questions that are going to be difficult to answer.
Given this special rule that Mary mentioned very briefly, the
30/90 day rule that allows an unwind of these hedge transactions
without imposing the detriment of these rules, that is, without
causing a gain recognition, the question is: How much need is
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there for more specific rules? If many taxpayers can avoid the
rules altogether by availing themselves of the unwind exception
in the statute?
So, in addition to trying to write rules that support good tax
policy and support the legislation and what Congress intended,
we also have to be very careful about how our resources are
spent there is a lot of different competing guidance that needs to
be provided right now.
MS. HARMON: The collars are really different because I know
that Congress was looking at them and was saying that the more
volatile the stock, the more likely that you are either going to hit
the put side or the call side of the collar. That is right, but you
do not hit it on day one. Also, which side are you going to hit
and when are you going to hit it? So, I would argue that unless
it is really a very tight collar or unless you find someone who is
such a good prophet regarding where stock prices would be at
the time that the collar would pay off, constructive sale treat-
ment should not be triggered. The collar value should be at least
consistent with the rest of that legislation and not cause sale
treatment until the taxpayer has actually eliminated its upside
and downside potential.
I am going to just throw out another proposal because this is
along my theme of the constructive sale rule being a fundamen-
tal change in the tax law. A change where the Government
made a policy call that the economics to the taxpayer were the
important determinative factor in whether to trigger gain or not,
as opposed to having the trigger be whether the taxpayer contin-
ues to have the vote on the stock, continues to control the corpo-
ration, or continues to have other shareholder or equity-holder
rights in the underlying equity.
There is a new proposal-it is just a member proposal right
now on the Hill-called the constructive ownership proposal, and
this proposal provides that in the situation where a taxpayer
does not own an underlying asset, does not go out and buy the
underlying asset but, instead, enters into a financial transaction
to receive the economics of that asset, the Government wants to
consider the taxpayer as owning the underlying asset. The Gov-
ernment's reasons for doing so is that if you buy a partnership
interest, you are going to have flow-through of gains and income
as it is earned in the partnership on your tax return. You will
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also have the character of that gain and income flow through to
your tax return.
If you enter into a swap or a collar on that partnership interest
instead of buying the partnership interest, the rules for partner-
ship flow-through do not apply to you. Because the Government
saw deferrals and recharacterization possibilities in these struc-
tures, or at least because Congresswoman Kennelly saw these
things, she has introduced the constructive ownership proposal
which, generally, would treat the taxpayer as owning the under-
lying stock.
The proposal is pretty brief at this point and there are many,
many questions raised by it. My guess would be that before it
really goes forward, there would be a lot more thought put into
it. I do not know if anything is happening or not.
MS. POTTER: I am not sure. Well, it is definitely something
that people are concerned about. It is also of very great interest
to Wall Street. I could tell you that right before-this was not a
provision that came from Treasury, although Treasury is sup-
portive of doing something about the issue-but right before the
provision actually was introduced by Mrs. Kennelly, I probably
got 10 to 15 calls a day asking me whether I was working on
something.
MS. HARMON: You made some statement to the PLI in Cali-
fornia, and I was not there. You have got to be careful what you
say.
MR. KLEINBARD: I thought in the time we have left, I would
do two things. First for the benefit of people who do not work in
the area, I want to take two minutes to try to put some of the
really useful points that Clarissa, Hap and Mary have made into
a little bit of context so that the comments can be seen in a
larger context. Second, if we have time, I want to talk a little bit
about the evolution of capital markets transactions that try to
accomplish in the capital markets, where there are public offer-
ings of securities, the same kinds of results that Hap and Mary
have described in a private contractual market.
It seems to me that in the area of financial products, you can
divide up to 97 percent of all the questions that arise into two
broad kind of themes. The first is the issue of whether the in-
strument has fixed economic returns or contingent economic re-
turns? Certain returns or uncertain returns?
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If an instrument has fixed returns, then you go and you get
David Garlock's bookl out of the library and you read about the
original discount issue rules. It is all very complicated but it is
most of the time, quite straightforward. It is when you have in-
struments that have uncertain returns that all of the controversy
tends to come up. There are three, and arguably perhaps now
four, basic themes relevant to what to do with financial instru-
ments that have uncertain returns.
The traditional answer is to do nothing; wait and see. Buy an
instrument and see what happens and pay your tax once you
know for sure. A profoundly exotic example of that is a share of
stock. You buy a share of stock. It goes up. You sell it. Then
you have gain. Do not do anything until you sell it. So, wait and
see is sort of the base case for what to do with uncertain cash
flow.
The second approach is what I think of as the expectations
theory, and I think Professor Reed Shuldiner has been the chief
intellectual architect of this being an instrument of tax policy.
The expectations theory says you may not know for sure what
you are going to get when you buy an instrument with contin-
gent flows, but you are buying it to get a positive return. There-
fore, we can tax you on the basis of some assumed positive re-
turn from the instrument. At some point, somewhere down the
line, we will have to catch up, we will have to reconcile the ex-
pectations with reality.
You see the expectation theory most comprehensively, and
perhaps wrongly, developed in the contingent payment debt
regulations, where it is used not only to construct the rule for
timing-because these are principally timing issues-but also to
mangle the character of gains that you realize.
So, wait and see is one timing rule and expectations theory is
another. The contingent payment debt regulations of 1275-412 is
the chief example of the actual application of the expectations
theory to solve the timing question, and then, as I said (this is
my modest view), to mangle the character of that gain as well.
The third approach is mark-to-market, which Clarissa talked
about. I think Clarissa's remarks on mark-to-market were par-
11 DAVID C. GARLOCK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF DEBT INSTRUMENTS (3d ed.
1997).
12 Treas. Reg. 1.1275-4(b) (1998).
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ticularly interesting because there is a tendency in academic
circles to see mark-to-market as a panacea. If only the Govern-
ment were bright enough to realize that mark-to-market is the
answer, we could all get on and do something more interesting
like law and anthropology or something like that.
In fact, mark-to-market turns out to be very difficult. There
are a handful of people in this room who have actually tried to
apply mark-to-market due to their business in the dealer com-
munity and in some aspects of the banking community and so
on. It turns out that there are all sorts of good reasons, intellec-
tual reasons, not simply that it is hard to value a particular in-
strument. There are also policy reasons why mark-to-market
has a much more limited utility than one might at first expect.
That is an area-the limitations on mark-to-market in the real
world-that has not been adequately explored, it seems to me.
In the real world where (in contrast to the academic world) pigs
in general do not have wings, it turns out that mark-to-market is
not always easily applied.
The fourth possible kind of rule to deal with the problems of
fixed versus contingent flows-and I am not frankly quite sure
whether this is a genuine category or just a subset of one of the
others-might be viewed as the mimicry rules. What I am
thinking of is the point that Mary has just gone through, the
constructive sale rule on the one hand, and the constructive
ownership rules on the other.
Let's take the constructive ownership side. We have a contin-
gent contract that produces contingent flows. How will we figure
out the timing of income from those flows? How will we figure
out the character of gain or loss from those flows. Let's do it by
analogizing the contract to the very underlying instrument it
mimics. For example, this instrument mimics an investment in
a partnership hedge fund. Well then, we will look to what it
mimics to determine the tax consequences. So, there are four
possible answers to timing, and to a lesser extent, to character
issues, associated with uncertain cash flows.
The second issue that comes up and the second big theme that
I just want to address-and I think this is a place where Clarissa
should feel very proud of what she has accomplished and what
Treasury has accomplished in the last five years-is when do you
look at an instrument as separate, by itself, to figure out what
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its tax consequences are? What cubbyhole do you stick it in?
When do you look at it in context to determine its income, de-
termine its timing, determine its character,-particularly its
character?
So, I see the first issue-the first cluster of issues as primarily
timing and to a lesser extent character. The second set of ques-
tions, the contextual use of an instrument, as raising character
first and then to a lesser extent, timing.
There is a perfect example of this second theme in the regula-
tions 13 that the Treasury came up with on hedging of the ordi-
nary gain or loss transactions or hedging liabilities. In those
regulations, an instrument that would ordinarily give rise to
capital gain or loss magically gives rise to ordinary income or
losses if it is used in a particular context to hedge an ordinary
income asset or to hedge an ordinary income liability.
So, the assets-the hedge, the vehicle itself-change their
character depending on the context. Emphasis upon the context
in which an instrument is used, rather than a single rule for an
instrument at all times has been the great accomplishment of
the Treasury in the last few years. It breaks down the cubby-
holes and says that the tax analysis of the instrument changes
depending on the context in which it is used. It is a very differ-
ent way of looking at an instrument.
The section 1221 hedging rule14 is one example that worked
very well. The straddle rules 15 are an example of the same kind
of principle done in a way that works very badly. They work
very badly because they are, in fact, the prime example of the
heads, Treasury wins, tails, taxpayer loses result, and they are
deliberately designed that way. It was not, "Oops, gee, look at
that. We ended up screwing taxpayers." It was deliberately de-
signed to accomplish that result in 1981.
MS. HARMON: Although they were looking at probably worse
transactions -
MR. KLEINBARD: Yes, absolutely.
MS. HARMON: -than the rules now apply to.
MR. KLEINBARD: No, you know the entire self-assessment
system was at stake. I absolutely agree with that. I think it is a
13 Treas. Reg. 1.1221-2 (1994).
14 Id.
15 I.R.C. § 1092 (1983).
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wonderful accomplishment that now Treasury is actually consid-
ering a proposed legislation to make those rules fairer, to make
them work in the context in both directions, not simply to defer
loss and not defer gain.
Finally, the best examples or the most powerful examples of
contextual analysis are the rules that Treasury has developed to
contemplate integrating different instruments. For example, as-
sume that the taxpayer issues a Malaysian Ringgit indexed
bond. Let me say first that anytime you see a U.S. corporation
issuing a financial instrument in public capital markets, a debt
instrument, that is extremely weird looking, what is going on
almost invariably is that the issuer has no interest in that par-
ticular bizarre financial bet that is embedded in that contract.
Rather, what they have is an investment banker who wants to
buy that bet from them at an attractive price and so they issue
Malaysian Ringgit indexed bonds and then they swap out all the
Malaysian Ringgit risk and swap themselves into a single dollar
instrument. In the old days, you would say, well what is the
taxation of Malaysian Ringgit index bonds or what is the taxa-
tion of the swap? Do those two rules ever speak to each other?
Of course not. You end up with bizarre results of one kind or an-
other.
Now we look at them and say hey, you swapped into a U.S.
dollar obligation. Let's forget all the stuff about the separate
cubbyholes of the instrument. Let's not even talk about the con-
text. Let's just treat them as they are. They are stapled eco-
nomically. Let's staple them for tax purposes and treat this as a
dollar borrowing by the issuer.
So, what we have seen in the last few years through the ini-
tiatives of the leadership in Treasury is a real breaking down of
the separate cubbyholes in which financial instruments are
placed, and the much more sophisticated notion of looking in-
stead at the context in which they arise.
MS. POTTER: I think Ed, something that you just pointed out
which is a really interesting observation especially in the current
environment, are the places where we have tended to be success-
ful at least by your judgment, have involved -
MR. KLEINBARD: Often wrong but never in doubt.
MS. POTTER: Have tended to involve transactions that give
rise solely to ordinary income or deduction. So, when we talk
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about the hedging transactions, those are transactions that are
conducted by businesses in connection with transactions from
which they would only get ordinary income, ordinary deduction.
We tend to be much less successful, as shown by the straddle
rules and also by Ed's criticism of our contingent debt rules,
when you have got contracts and transactions that can give rise
either only to capital gains and losses or to both capital gains
and losses and ordinary gains and losses.
The reason for this is that it is just incredibly difficult to ac-
commodate both, especially in transactions where you can move
capital loss into the ordinary deduction basket or ordinary in-
come into the capital gain basket. We continue to have a tre-
mendous struggle on that front which, unfortunately, has been
recently made significantly worse. I am afraid that the prospect
of getting the kind of good results, in context as Ed put it, I think
quite appropriately, for things that give rise to both capital in-
come and deduction, and ordinary income and deduction is-I
am not sure that the prospect of that is real favorable, unfortu-
nately.
MR. KLEINBARD: In the 3 or 4 minutes I have left, I will re-
turn to the prepared text having delivered this little homily. To
the extent anybody in fact, which would surprise me, was inter-
ested in the prepared part of the remarks, they are based on a
paper that appeared in Louis Freeman's twelve volume annual
PLI extravaganza, in a little piece called, Everything I Know
About New Financial Products I Learned From DECS. 16
What we are going to talk about here is, I just think it is inter-
esting to see how similar economic ideas can be translated into
different marketplaces. Mary talked about the costless collar as
a way of reducing risk in respect of appreciated position that a
taxpayer owns and then if need be, monetizing that to a borrow-
ing.
One of the problems with costless collars or with shorts
against the box, back when you could do them, is that they are
limited in size by the existing market place, the existing liquidity
in the market place for the stocks in question. This is because
16 Edward D. Kleinbard & Erika W. Nijenhuis, Everything I Know About New Finan-
cial Products I Learned From DECS, in Tax Strategies for Corporate Acquisitions, Dis-
positions, Spin-Offs, Joint Ventures, Financings, Reorganizations and Restructurings
1997, at 461 (PLI Tax L. & Est. Planning Handbook Series No. 412, 1997).
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the other side to the transaction is typically a dealer, and dealers
are not in fact interested in making the equal and opposite bet to
the bet that you want to make. Dealers are interested in making
a dealer spread and they do that by hedging the risk that they
are taking by writing a contract with you. So, they need to have
some way of hedging.
For that and for some other reasons, people ask the question,
can we do costless collars not by writing a contract with the
dealer who then has to go out and hedge and, in fact, entering
the cost of hedging into the price that the dealer offers you, but
rather by going directly to the capital markets, the public mar-
kets for stocks and bonds. That is what the original exchange-
able DECS product was all about. That is exactly the same idea
translated into the capital markets, and the basic context in
which the idea originally developed was that there were lots of
corporations out there with strategic investments that they had
made. They owned 18 percent of some other public company and
then they decided that was a really stupid strategic investment
or that it was the prior CEO's strategic investment, and so they
wanted to get rid of it, but they wanted to get rid of it in some
way that would maximize their return and not make them look
too stupid if they sold too quickly.
So what they basically came up with was a public costless col-
lar transaction. The first one was called DECS. I do not even
think that the investment banker who did that remembers what
DECS stands for, but I think it is debt exchangeable for common
stock, and the basic idea was a contract sold in the public mar-
kets, called a note for SEC purposes. You know at the top it says
note, and promises to give to the investor for every $50- we are
going to assume that share of stock today is worth $50 -to give
to the investor at the end of 3 years, one share of stock if the
stock price was at $50 or below, to give them $50 worth of stock
between $50 and $60 in value, and give them 5/6ths of a share of
stock for value above $60 a share.
If you think about that for a moment, what that means from
the point of view of the seller of this security is that it has writ-
ten in effect a costless collar in one sense. It has bought a put to
the public-put to the investors at $50, and it has written a call
at $60, on 5/6ths of a share so that the issuer- maybe this dia-
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gram helps here. 17 I only have two accomplishments in my life.
One was that I coined the term cubbyhole for financial instru-
ments and the other was describing this curve as a kinky for-
ward contract and it has been the only way I have gotten people
interested in working in tax law at my firm - by telling them
that they can work on kinky forward contracts.
The payoff return is in fact exactly the same as the return that
you would see if you would map out your-if you take this, this is
the investor return. If you do the flip side, the issuer who owns
the underlying stock and has written the contract to sell the un-
derlying stock, his return would be in effect to mirror this, he
would have-he would be flat $50 for the first piece. He would
then make all the profits from $50 to $60 and 1/6th of the profit
above $60 in this example.
At the end of 3 years the investor gets between 5/6ths of a
share and 1 share depending on where you are on the curve, or
the issuer gives cash instead and just keeps the stock. He
changes his mind and then the third CEO comes along and says
that was a good strategic investment after all.
The instrument essentially, as I said, replicates a collar and a
borrowing, but the instrument itself is different and its tax char-
acteristics have to be described. It pays interest every period. It
pays off at maturity a value-a share of stock or cash for the
value between zero and infinity. So, I will end with these ques-
tions and stop here. It raises the very question that we have
been talking about all along. It raises the question first, what-
and unfortunately I kind of slanted the answer in how I phrased
this here.
MS. POTTER: What a surprise.
MR. KLEINBARD: It raises the question: What is the nature
of this instrument in the first place? What cubbyhole does not it
belong to because we have not completely abolished all cubby-
holes? Is this instrument a contingent bond in which case one
set of rules apply or is it something new and different? The con-
clusion we came to-and yelled at everybody until they decided it
was easier to agree than to keep persisting-is that it is some-
thing new and different. In fact it is a publicly offered collateral-
17 See Edward D. Kleinbard, Exchangeable DECS - Payout Schedule, appended
herein as Appendix I, at 34.
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ized forward contract, so that for the first time, they saw a public
market in collateralized forward contracts. Collateral makes a
lot of sense here since the issuer does not know who is going to
buy these contracts at maturity and, therefore, we created a new
cubbyhole which is -you know, when you do not like the results
of existing cubbyholes -
MS. HARMON: That Clarissa agreed with or no?
MR. KLEINBARD: Absolutely. The second question is
whether issuing the contract creates a constructive sale and that
is a question that Mary just talked about. It is the same ques-
tion here as in the private contracts.
The third question is well, if this in fact is not a contingent
debt instrument, what do you do with all that interest that is
paid every period? The answer is that it still is interest. Then
people say, "Oh, but you said it is two instruments and it is
really only one instrument." This becomes very metaphysical.
This is sort of like the scholasticism of the 13th century or some-
thing, and the answer is no. You can have one overall contract
in respect of which they could deposit some cash on which inter-
est is paid.
Hap gave you that example earlier. That is where the short
sale is. You do a short sale. As he says, you can make and lose a
lot of money but you have got cash in our short sale. Your broker
pays you interest on that. The fact that you are getting interest
on the cash in the short sale does not mean it is not a short sale.
It means it is a short sale on which you happen to be getting
some interest on your cash that is kept at your broker.
Finally, we have the dreaded straddle issue. So the DECS in-
strument, and then there are a series of fun permutations of this
in more recent years that the article that I referred to goes
through, the DECS instrument tees up in the public markets
with exactly the same issues as we talked about in the beginning
with respect to the private market.
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APPENDIX I
EXCHANGEABLE DECS - PAYOUT
SCHEDULE
EDWARD D. KLEINBARD
Payout
$50 $60
Stock Price
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